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Article 8

RECENT CASE NOTES
CRIMINAL LAW-CONSP&ACY-EFFECT OF PAYMENT OF CO-CONSPIRATORS

-The defendant was charged by affidavit in two counts with conspiracy
to commit a felony and with transporting intoxicating liquor in an auto-'
mobile. Three others were also charged with the same offenses in the same
affidavit, but the defendant was tried separately and convicted on the conspiracy count. Defendant had employed, and paid, the others named in the
affidavit to go to Chicago from Indianapolis in defendant's car and bring
back liquor from a place specified by the defendant. The liquor was obtained as directed and brought back by these persons as far as the outskirts of Indianapolis, where two deputies arrested them. Defendant contended that since he formulated the plan and made all the arrangements in
Chicago and Indianapolis for the transportation of the liquor and had employed the co-defendants as agents to assist him, directing each what to
do, that he could not be guilty of a criminal conspiracy. In other words,
he says that one can not conspire with his employees to commit a felony.
Held: Judgment affirmed. The elements of criminal conspiracy were sufficiently proved. Jormanv. State, Supreme Court of Indiana, December 4,
1928, 163 N. E. 837.
One can not conspire with himself (12 C. J. 542); and to constitute a
conspiracy there must be a combination by two or more people by some concerted action to accomplish some unlawful or criminal purpose by some
criminal or unlawful means. Brewster v. State, 186 Ind. 369.
However, the fact that a salary was paid by one to another would not
preclude a conspiracy between them as it was not inconsistent with a full
and active participation in the scheme. Hyde v. U. S., 225 U. S. 347. And
one's participation in a criminal conspiracy is not excused by showing that
the service he was employed to render called for such participation. Hardy
v. U. S., 256 Fed. 284.
It is not essential for the formation of a conspiracy that any formal
agreement exist between the parties to do the act charged; it is enough if
the minds of the parties meet understandingly, so that an intelligent and
deliberate agreement is brought about to do the things charged, although
the agreement need not be manifested in any formal words. McGee v.
State, 111 Ind. 378; Musser v. State, 157 Ind. 423; Eacock v. State, 169
Ind. 488. And of course a conspiracy may be proved by circumstantial
evidence. Archer -v. State, 106 Ind. 426; Cookv . State, 1,69 Ind. 430; Musser v. State, 157 Ind. 423.
R. C. H.
The case seems sound and in accord with the decided cases.
CRImINAL LAW-LAWFUL ARREST-SEARCH AND SEHURE-INTOXICATING

LiQUORS--Defendant was charged with unlawful and felonious transportation of intoxicating liquor under section 2720 Burns 1926. Defendant was
lawfully arrested while driving an automobile for committing a misdemeanor. The officers in searching the automobile, found intoxicating liquor.
Defendant found guilty; motion for new trial overruled. Overruling of
493
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motion assigned as error. Held: That the admission of the evidence of
the three police officers as to what they found during the search of Defendant's automobile was competent evidence, and the Judgment Afirmed. Allgaier v. State, Supreme Court of Indiana. January 4, 1929. 164 N. E. 315.
A peace officer can arrest a person for committing a misdemeanor without a warrant. The officer making the lawful arrest has the right to search
the person and to seize evidence tending to establish the crime for which
the accused was arrested, or other crimes. Sections 27 and 36 Cornelius
Search and Seizure. After the lawful arrest of the appellant, as incidental
to the same, the officer had a right to search the automobile, in which the
accused was riding at the time of the arrest without a search warrant.
Haverstick v. State, 196 Indiana 145. Koscielske v. State, 158 N. E. 902.
The principal case is to be distinguished from Wallace v. State, 157 N. E.
657, in that in the principal case the arrest itself was lawful, and the
search and seizure was an incident to that lawful arrest; whereas in the
Wallace case the arrest was illegal, hence no right to make the subsequent
search and seizure. Mere possession of liquor in automobile is not sufficient to justify a conviction for transportation therein. Dresser v. State,
194 Indiana 8. Transportation means conveying from one place to another. Hammell v. State, 198 Indiana 45, 152 N. E. 161. Person placed
under arrest before search was made on charge of misdemeanor can not
have any evidence so found suppressed. Liquor found under such circumstances is competent in prosecution for transportation of liquor. Haverstick v. State, supra, Jameson v. State, 196 Indiana 483. Section 2715
Burns 1926, prohibiting transportation of "vinous or spirituous liquor," is
applicable to alcohol or whiskey, without proof that it is intoxicating or
that it was intended for beverage purposes. Chandsie v. State, 163 N. E.
266.
S.M.C.
. INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT-WHAT CoNsTrruTE--APPEAL AND ERRORTo an action for divorce by husband against wife, defendant filed a crosscomplaint, was granted a divorce thereunder and alimony in the sum of
$1,500. After plaintiff's motion for a new trial was overruled, he appealed.
After the appeal was perfected, the cause was redocketed in the trial court;
and on defendant's verified petition, plaintiff was ordered to pay defendant
$400 for attorney's fees and expenses in defending the appeal. From that
order or judgment plaintiff appealed, but did not file a transcript and
assignment of errors within 30 days nor did he file a bond, as required in
appeals from interlocutory orders by sec. 713, Burns 1926. Held: The
judgment appealed from was not interlocutory, therefore not governed by
sec. 713, Burns 1926. Cause transferred to Appellate Court. Cirtin v.
Cirtin, Sup. Ct., Ind., Apr. 6, 1928, 164 N. E. 493.
"Interlocutory" in law means that which does not decide the cause, but
settles some intervening matter relating to the cause. Words And Phrases,
Second Series, 1149. An interlocutory judgment, decree, or order seems
to be one rendered during the course of the trial of the cause, before final
judgment, and which does not touch the merits of the cause so as to affect
the rights of the parties. Pfeiffer v. Crane, 89 Ind. 485, Mac-Saw-Ba Club
v. Coffin, 169 Ind. 204, 82 N. E. 461, Neyens v. Flesher, 39 Ind. App. 399,
79 N. E. 1087, Words And Phrases, Second Series, 1149, 1152. Tested by
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these principles, since the order in question was entered after a final judgment on the merits of the cause itself, the order does not seem to be interlocutory, and an appeal from it is not restricted by sec. 73, Burns 1926.
Because the order is not on a cause included in sec. 1356, Burns 1926,
D. J.
its appeal was rightly transferred to the Appellate Court.
MORTGAGEE-RIGHT OF SUBROGATION-The defendant, Estella Moore, on
Dec. 23, 1921, borrowed $1,500 from the Greensburg Nat. Bank and executed
a note therefor secured by a mortgage on her real estate. The defendant
and her husband were indebted to the Farmers Trust Co. of Indianapolis
to the sum of $12,000. This debt was evidenced by their promissory note,
secured by a mortgage on real estate owned by her husband. They were
also indebted to the appellant herein for $4,000 which was evidenced by
their note and secured by a mortgage on real estate of the husband. This
last mortgage was junior to the one held by the Trust Co. Suits were
brought to foreclose these last two mortgages and a decree was given
ordering the lands covered by the mortgages to be sold and the proceeds
applied first to payment of the Trust Co. and second to the payment of
appellants. A deficiency judgment was granted against the appellee Moore.
Upon sale of the lands, there was a deficiency and appellant received
nothing upon its judgment. Estella Moore applied to appellee, Aetna Life
Ins. Co. for and received a loan of $2,000 to pay off the indebtedness to
the Greensburg Nat. Bank. A note was given to the Insurance company
for said loan and a mortgage covering the same land covered by the
Greensburg Bank Mortgage. The debt to the Greensburg Bank was paid
whereupon it released its mortgage. Appellee insurance company at the
same time it made the loan had no actual knowledge of the existence of the
deficiency judgment against Moore and the same was not shown upon the
abstract of title furnished the insurance company for its examination prior
to its making the loan. Insurance company claims it is subrogated to the
rights of the Greensburg Bank. First Nat. Bank of Westport v. Moore,
et al., Appellate Court of Indiana, Nov. 15, 1928; 163 N. E. 602. Held:
Insurance company entitled to be subrogated.
The right of subrogation is not founded upon contract, express or
implied, but upon principles of equity and justice, and includes every instance in which one party, not a mere volunteer, pays a debt for another,
primarily liable, and which in good conscience should have been paid by the
latter. Davis v. Schlemmer, Admr., 150 Ind. 472; Miller v. Winchell, 70
N. Y. 437; Spaulding v. Harvey, 129 Ind. 106. A person who may be
compelled to pay a debt, or the protection of whose property or interest
requires that he pay it, is not a volunteer. Sidener v. Pavey, 77 Ind. 241;
Warford v. Hawkins, 150 Ind. 489; Farmers Bank v. Erie R. R. Co., 72
N. Y. 188. Nor is one, who at the instance of the debtor advances money
to be used by the debtor in the payment of a prior security, a mere stranger,
volunteer or intermeddler in his affairs. Sidener v. Pavey, 77 Ind. 241;
Shattuck v. Cox, 128 Ind. 293; Arnold v. Green, 116 N. Y. 566. Applying
the principles as here laid down, the appellant, Westpoint Nat. Bank, is in
no worse position than it would have been if the mortgage to the Greensburg Bank had not been paid and no injustice is done by it, for it can not
complain that subrogation makes its position less favorable than it would
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have been if the Insurance company had not advanced the money with
which the mortgage was paid off. Having made the loan without actual
knowledge of the existence of the deficiency judgment, it is immaterial
that a release instead of as assignment was made. No innocent third
party having intervened equity will give relief against the mistake, and
the person advancing the money with which the mortgage was paid off
will be treated as an equitable assignee of the claim paid. Southern Cotton
Oil Co. v. Napoleon Hill Cotton Co., 158 S. W. 1082; Sidener v. Percy, 77
Ind. 241; Loan Assn. v. Sparks, 111 Fed. 652.
R. H. L.
TORTS-CONSENT--RIGHT OF ACTION-Action by appellee, Roy Hardesty,
as administrator of the estate of Arretta Hardesty, against appellant, for
damages for the death of the deceased. It appeared that appellant, a
practicing physician, for a consideration and with the consent of the deceased, performed an operation upon her for the purpose of procuring an
abortion, and that she died immediately following and as a result of the
operation. Held: Judgment against appellant affirmed. Martin v. Hardesty, Appellate Court of Indiana, Nov. 22, 1928, 163 N. E. 610.
Sec. 2435, Burns' Ann. St. 1926, makes it a criminal offense to perform
an operation upon a woman with intent to procure an abortion, unless the
operation is necessary to save human life. In sec. 2436, Burns' Ann. St.
1926, it is likewise made a criminal offense to submit to an operation with
intent thereby to procure an abortion except when done by a physician for
the purpose of saving the life of mother or child. Sec. 292, Burns' Ann. St.
1926, provides that, when the death of one is caused by the wrongful act or
omission of another, the personal representative of the former may maintain an action therefor against the latter, if the former might have maintained an action had he lived, against the latter for an injury for the same
act or omission. Appellant contends that Aretta Hardesty, had she lived,
could not have maintained the action against appellant, for the reason that
she consented to the illegal act of which complaint is made and it is therefore insisted that, under the above statute, (sec. 292), the personal representative has no cause of action. The general rule at common law was
that voluntary consent to a tort was a complete defense against civil liability therefor. But this rule had its exception in that consent to do an act
which in itself was unlawful, forbidden by positive law, and for the doing
of which a penalty was attached, was no defense to an action for damages
by the injured party. Adams v. Waggoner, 33 Ind. 531; 38 Cyc. 530;
Logan v. Austin, 1 Stew. (Ala.) 476; Shay v. Thompson, 59 Wis. 540;
Morris v. Miller, (Neb.), 119 N. W. 458; Mathew v. Ollerton, Comb. 218;
Stout v. Wren, 1 Hawks. 420.
It results, therefore, that the consent of the deceased to the acts of
the appellant do not exonerate him from liability to respond in damages,
because the acts consented to were such as the law will not countenance.
Hence under sec. 292, Burns' Ann. St. 1926, the personal representative has
a good cause of action. Milliken v. Heddesheimer, (Ohio) 144 N. E. 264;
Hancock v. Hullett, (Ala.) 82 So. 522; Miller v. Boyer (Wis.) 68 N. W.
869. Although a few jurisdictions have held contra, the decision in the
present case is supported by the weight of authority.
H. C. IA

